Abstract massive deployment, and it is expected that they will soon outnumber all other computing device types. Consequently, This paper examines two unlinkably anonymous, simple RFIDs are increasingly used in applications that interface RFID identification protocols that require only the ability with information security functions. Ultimately, these should be accomplished with as rigorous availability properties, while still permitting the design of a view of security as other types of applications. practical RFID protocols. We show that two protocols are The goal of this paper is to consider unlinkably anonyprovably secure within the new security model. Our proofs mous authentication protocols for secure RFID applicado not employ random oracles the protocols are shown tions that: to be secure in the standard model under the assumption 1) are provably secure in a strong adversarial model, of existence ofpseudo-random function families.
tional capabilities imply that traditional distributed multiThe main contribution is a universally composable party computation techniques for securing communication security model tuned for RFID applications. By making protocols are not feasible, and instead that lightweight apspecific setup, communication, and concurrency assumpproaches must be considered. Yet the privacy and security tions that are realistic in the RFID application setting, requirements of RFID applications can be quite significant. we arrive at a model that guarantees strong security and Ultimately, these should be accomplished with as rigorous availability properties, while still permitting the design of a view of security as other types of applications. practical RFID protocols. We show that two protocols are
The goal of this paper is to consider unlinkably anonyprovably secure within the new security model. Our proofs mous authentication protocols for secure RFID applicado not employ random oracles the protocols are shown tions that: to be secure in the standard model under the assumption 1) are provably secure in a strong adversarial model, of existence ofpseudo-random function families.
and that remain secure under universal composition with arbitrary applications. 2) are computationally lightweight, taking into con-I. Introduction sideration the hardware-imposed constraints of the platform.
Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFIDs) were 3) are scalable to a large volume of devices. initially developed as very small electronic hardware components having as their main function to broadcast a unique A. What IS UC security? identifying number upon request. The simplest types of RFIDs are passive tags, that do not contain a power source, The universal composability (UC) framework specifies and are incapable of autonomous activity. These devices a particular approach to security proofs, and guarantees are powered by the reader's radio waves, and the antenna that proofs that follow that approach remain valid if the doubles as a source of inductive power. The low cost and protocol is composed with others (modularity) and under high convenience value of RFIDs give them a potential for arbitrary concurrent protocol executions (including with itself).
*This research is supported by the National Science Foundation under grants CCR-0209092 and ANI-0087641. Multicast challenges are addressed to all tags in the range they are more likely to be used as components of more of a reader, whereas unicast challenges are addressed to complex systems, possibly ubiquitous. UC is the only specific tags. In our protocols below we consider both security model that allows for a modular approach for types of challenges. Note that our multicast challenges the design of protocols, using pre-designed, off-the-shelf are just random strings, and all tags in the range of a components.
reader Rj are challenged with the same random string;
In this paper we formulate protocol security in terms this is more communication-efficient than multiple unicast of indistinguishability between real and ideal protocol challenges. The server periodically updates the value of simulations. This formalism was informally proposed by the common, random challenge. During each period a tag
Goldwasser et al. [6] , and more properly specified by may be authenticated at most once. Beaver et al. [7] , [8] , [9] . Canetti was the first to conWe shall assume that all honest tags Ti adhere to sider computationally bounded adversaries in this setting, the system specifications and the requirements of the establishing the universal composability framework [10] , authentication protocol. . .
to all the oracles Qi, 1 < i < X, and can interact with these C. Security definitons via calls that will be specified below. We shall refer to these interactions as conversations. Crucial to the UC approach
We now formally define the security goals of anonyis the notion of a simulation environment Z. Z to SA. It resets its database, so that it is empty at the start that was initialized as Oi. We note that in this definition, of the period.
A is not required to know under which identity Ti it SEND(i, i): F generates a new random value r, and has succeeded in authenticating itself. Furthermore thentication protocol that addresses most of the drawbacks in the ideal world results in a true random pair of the same of the authentication protocols in [22] , [23] , [5] , [24] , [25] . length being returned. These pairs are indistinguishable by
The protocol is an extension of YA-TRAP Yet Another Z who does not have the key Ki due to the pseudoTrivial Authentication Protocol, proposed by G. Tsudik [5] .
randomness of the function family {H(K, )}IK.
We also discuss how to accommodate kill-keys in both attacks. In the first step the tag is authenticated, whereas in T's database, where 1 < j < X, or in the second optional step the server authenticates the (d) m. can be parsed as rl h, where h = timestamp. The protocol is given in Figure 4 .
H(Ki,r Sys r), for some Ki, where f < i < n.
We now consider the cases where the outcomes for A and Fig. 4 . YA-TRAP+ SA differ, and argue that these only happen with negligible probability. by SA in the ideal world. Since the ideal world values are chosen truly at random, this can only happen with negliPass 3 is optional, used by the server during a time gible probability. It follows that (a) and (c) correspond to period when the number of attacks that occur is beyond a each other with overwhelming probability.
certain threshold and the server would like to resynchroFinally, the authentication outcomes could be identical nize the correct timestamp t for all the tags. The optional for A and SA and yet the authenticated identities output pass is used with all tags during such a time period so that by Os in the real and ideal worlds might differ. Clearly, if no identity information is revealed. When this period is this happens with one of the identities corresponding to an over, the server may return to normal authentication. This honest party, it would imply either a collision between outmakes the scheme resistant to DoS while being almost as puts of two independent pseudo-random functions (causing efficient as the YA-TRAP protocol. identity mismatch in the real world) or that a pseudoWe obtain the following new result for YA-TRAP±, random function matched a random value chosen by .F whose proof will be provided in a full version of this paper: information leakage. In the case of YA-TRAP+, the disabling mechanism is very simple. The server executes the authentication protocol with t > t' -known to S and executes
